Introduction
Thestill persistent idea the Internet may be aforce that encourages democratic developments justbecause it exists betrays its origin going backtothe "good old time" of the virtual community of Howard Rheingold (1993) in the beginnings of the Internet, still based on Bulletin Board Systems,Usenetgroups,etc.
We might say the ArabU prisings tell us this assumption may be true.B ut lookingatthe uprisingsafter the fog of mediauproar -and the usual somewhat delayed academic reaction -l ifted we may tell another story.T he so-called Facebook, Tw itter, YouTube revolutions were revolutions that used all media available (see Najar 2013) but were successful physically in the public space (see, e. g., Dabashi 2012; Achcar 2013) . Remember Tahrir place in Egypt or thePearl place in Bahrain!T he tragedyo ft he Syrian people and the emergence of the professional Internet or cyber warfare by entities like IS (Islamic State) demonstrate that there is no democratic DNAbuilt into online platforms-leaving aside the mere fact we are talking about business companies that shouldbeprofitable.
So it is not surprising that fundamentalist movements,groups,and individuals are successfully active online since there is no intrinsic democratic characterofthe Web. It is not acase of "dividedmodernity" (Tibi 1985 ) -one part exploitedby fundamentalists,t he technical one,a nd the otherp art, the democratic,e nlight-ened one,ignored by them -, an idea that shows anormative misunderstanding of technology as amere tool to be used.
This does not mean Ineglect the influence of the "mentalitØ technique" (Simondon2006) on our perception of the world. Iwould rather like to introduce the idea of the agencyo ft echnology (e.g., Latour 2005; H arman 2009) into the discussion of fundamentalism and the Internet. Ther ole of technology can be understood as part of an etwork of actors including humans and technological devices that may not be divided into isolated entitiesb ut related to eachother.
Coming back to the question if the Internet can be regardeda saspace of freedom, Eugene Thacker wrotei nt he foreword to AlexanderR .G alloway Protocol (2004, pp.XIII-XIV) (!)oncode,protocol, and networks:
Further, code is not necessarily language,and certainly not asign.Acode,inthe sense that Protocol defines it, is process-based: It is parsed, compiled, procedural or objectoriented, and defined by ontology standards. Acode is aseries of activated mechanical gears,orastackofpunched cards circulating throughatape-reading machine,oraflow of light-pulses or bits in atransistororonsilicon, or avat of binding interactionsbetween DNAfragments.
When the book suggests that networks are not metaphors (or not merely metaphors), the dichotomy is not one between material and immaterial, but rather between two types of "abstract". On the one hand, there is an abstract use of the concept of networks generally to signify any relationship between discrete entities.Accordingtothis usage, just aboutanything can be seen as anetwork (and thus the overwhelmingly wide application of certain network science or complexity approaches).But there is alsoanother meaning of "abstract", one that is not the opposite of concrete.Anabstract that is real is a potential. (Henri Bergson uses the term "virtual" for the immanent unfolding of duration as potentiality.) This is not the abstractu se of network as at erm, and neither is it an abstraction of atechnical term (the metaphorization of technological terms). Rather, this abstract-but-real is the networkthat is alwaysenacted and always about to enact itself. One can pose the question:Isanetworkanetwork if it is not being used?Isthe Internet a networkbecause of its fiber-optic cables,its usage, its data transfer, the standards for such use,orthe conceptsthat inform the development of networktechnology itself ?Likely all of these (Galloway 2004, pp.XIII-XIV). But there is more to networks.Following these early insights again we shouldturn to the protocols governing the Web:
If,i nt he discourses surrounding networks, the tropes of connectivity,c ollectivity,a nd participation obscure the material practiceso fn etworks, Protocol points to several principles for understanding networksas"adiagram, atechnology,and amanagement style". To begin with, general talk about"networks", dissociated from their context and technical instantiation, can be replacedbyadiscussion of "protocols". Every networkisa networkb ecause it is constituted by ap rotocol. If networksd isplay any of the tropes mentioned above, it is because there is an infrastructure that enables such properties to emerge.N ot networks,b ut protocols.G iven this,P rotocol can be reada sabook of political economy.Itargues for amethodological shiftfrom ageneralized understanding of networkstoaspecified one,inwhich the protocological systems of TCP/IP and DNS operatea sw hat Foucaultt ermed "political technologies" (Galloway 2004, p. XVIII) .
These political technologies ensure control and managemento fn etworks,t he Internet in general. So -a sw es tated before -t here is no intrinsic democratic value of the Webifwedonot believe in the marketing hype of socialmedia or Web 2.0, bothconceptsinvented for marketing purposes,orparticipation and sharing, etc. -just the same.
Tu rning to the users who use the network and by being auser enact the network as mentioned above,o ur positive view of the Weba nd social media may be disturbed again. Geert Lovink wrote about thenihilistic,self-centered worldview expressed by bloggers some years ago (Lovink 2008) .Although thatsnot the full story of blogging from ag lobal point of view,r eflecting aE uropean/North American experience rather, there is something true about it. Blogs and social media are first of all an instrument to present yourself,y our worldviews to an audience listening to you and your elaborations.
Then ew forms of digitalc ommunicationa re shapedb yas pecific form of individuality (Reichert 2008) it is said. Iwould like to say subjectivity instead of individualitysince users are better understood as subjected to technical and social domination. Studies focusing on the "sovereignty of the individual spiritual consumer" (Houtman /A upers 2010, p. 7) tend to overlook theses tructures of power. There are technical constraints:Users take these constraints for granted, e. g.,using 140 signs to express-not yourself!-but to put your communication online on Tw ittertogive avery basic example.
But there are also social constraints -o rt ob em ore moderate:c ontexts.T o move away from the academic practice of privileging written ideas or anything printed, we should remind us:
Social media sites are full of: -Demographic information; -Lists of friends,family,and associates; -Logs of activities,preferences,and favorites; -Maps showingplaces apersongoes and how frequently; -T ime-stamped posts that indicate where aperson was and when;and -T he content of the posts themselves,where people detail their thoughts, feelings, and ideas (Golbeck 2015, p. 1; see also Golbeck 2015) .
So when talkingabout socialmedia, we are talking about manythings.But Iwill restrictmyargument to the last three elements of the list:"thoughts,feelings,and ideas".S ocial media gave birth to an ew mediac ulture of practices of the selfincluding guiding yourself,confession, book-keeping and avery precise form of benchmarking your performance,anexperimental way of relating to yourself and an esthetic of self-staging.
Social media sites provide an ambiance for new practices of subjectivity,creating new forms of centeringonthe self and new relations of power.Social media expectt he willingness of the user to give away more and more data and information to open for them awindow of participation. Theuser has to be willing to submit to the new regimeofvisibility.This means to accept the need to learnthe ever new forms of self-expression, to master these forms,and -onanadvanced level -torefine these forms.
Them ost recent form of this way self-staging may be the hype of selfies (Reichert 2015) . We may assume it will slowly fade awaydue to the fact it has been appropriated by Barack Obamaetal.,anact killing all forms of youth protest and self-styling. But there is still another way of self-stylingnot referringtoage groups, professional groups or social strata.Itispart of larger realm of "digital religion" (Hoover /Echchaibi 2014) that can be comparedtothe emergence of religion in the context of older new technologies:
Ap rodigiouss cholarly and lay discourse has developed since at least the mid-1990s focused on thew ays that emergentd igital technologies and practices might have implications for religion and the meaning of "the religious". From the beginning, much of this speculation focused on the capacities of technologies to substitutef or or compete with received and known valences of religion. In this way,itwas not that different from the prior emergence of the mediatedbroadcast religion we now know as "televangelism". In that case as well, most commentary (both popular and scholarly) focused on how this emergent phenomenon-and one that was brought abouta"new technology"ofthe time -(cable television)might have implications religion and its legitimated structures,contexts,a nd practices.I tw as difficult for observers to think about that new mediation of religionoutside received categories,terms,definitions,and metaphors.With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see that televangelism was not just "about" substitutingfor prior practice.Itwas more profoundly are-making of the expectations,meanings and contexts throughwhich religion is not only transmitted, received,s hared and practiced but also about new generativities,new formsof"the religious", and their extents and boundaries. Te levangelism itself was not the point. It opened the door to re-imagining where religion might be produced and by whom (Hoover /Echchaibi 2014, p. 2) .
We may join Hoover /Echchaibi in their question: [I] t became obvious to us that much could be gained in our understanding by re-centering our focus on "the religious digital" (thus broadly defined), its attributes,e xtents,a nd limits.Rather than assuming received categories of religion, spirituality,orreligiousor spiritual politics,orreceived physical or cultural geographies (the local/global dualism an example of the former, and genderpolitics an example of the latter)what might we learn by assuming that in digitalreligion we were looking at somethingonits own terms and its own locations? (Hoover /Echchaibi 2014, p. 5 ).
So we are talking about digital religion:
Digital religion is religiont hat is constituted in new ways throughd igital media and cultures.Hoover highlights that this may lead to anew understanding of religion, one that is rooted in unique understandings and experiencesofmediation of meaning via digital technology.This recognizesthatthe reformulation of existing religious practices has both online and offline implications.I ta lso means digital culture negotiates our understandings of religious practice in ways that can lead to new experiences, authenticity,and spiritual reflexivity.Based on this Isuggest that the term "digital religion" describes the technological and cultural space that is evoked when we talk abouthow online and offline religious spheres have become blendedorintegrated. We can think of digital religion as a bridge that connects and extends online religious practicesa nd spaces into offline religious contexts,and vice versa. This merging of new and established notions of religious practicemeans digitalreligion is imprinted by both the traits of online culture (suchas interactivity,c onvergence,a nd audience-generated content) and traditional religion (such as patternso fb elief and ritual tied to historically grounded communities) (Campbell 2013, pp.3f.) .
Fundamentalist movements active on the Weba re ap articular form of digital religion. We will look into fundamentalism online by focusing on videos.Thereare other areas of research on onlinef undamentalism, e. g. ,t he use of memes (see Bellar et al. 2013 ), but still videosseem to be the most influential onlinepractice of fundamentalists.
Fundamentalism
To give akind of definition, Iwould like to turn to Martin Riesebrodt (see Riesebrodt 2005) . He stated that contrary to the widespread view that fundamentalists are pursuing political aims we may insist on the fact that most fundamentalist groups organizet hemselves as subcultures or ak ind of communal organizationss eparating itself symbolically or in space from other groupso rc ultural milieus.T hese communal organizations and subcultures try to create circumstancesa llowingt hem to follow their lifestyle without any restrictions and to educate the following generations.S oi nm ost cases thes haping of subjectivity throughapious way of living the cultivation of aspecific religious ethos is at the center of fundamentalist activity.
Piety Movement in Egypt
Foracase study we may look at the piety movement of women in Egypt from the 1980s onward:
According to participants,the mosque movement had emerged in response to the perception that religious knowledge,a sameans of organizing daily conduct,h ad become increasingly marginalizedu nder modem structureso fs ecularg overnance.T he movementsp articipants usually describe the impact of this trend on Egyptian society as "secularization" (almana or almāniyya)o r" westernization" (tagharrub), ah istorical process which they arguehas reduced Islamic knowledge (both as amode of conduct and as et of principles) to an abstract system of beliefs that has no direct bearing on the practicalities of daily living. In response,the womensmosque movement seekstoeducate ordinary Muslimsi nt hose virtues,e thical capacities,a nd formso fr easoning that participants perceive to have become either unavailable or irrelevantt ot he lives of ordinaryM uslims. Practically,t his means instructing Muslims not only in the proper performance of religious duties and acts of worship but, morei mportantly, in how to organize their dailyconduct in accord with principles of Islamic pietyand virtuous behavior.
Despite its focus on issues of piety,i tw ould be wrongt oc haracterize the womens mosque movement as an abandonmentofpolitics (see Mahmood 2005, p. 4) .
To rephrase the approach of Riesebrodt, we may say that fundamentalism is away of organizing itself as subcultures or communal organizationsh aving political implicationsfor the society at large.Turning to fundamentalism and the media we may look into So we may look at fundamentalist, pious subcultures and groups as entities creatingn ew forms of subjectivity creating the community again and again by perpetuating the fundamentalist ethosand using modern media, in his case study audiocassettes,CDs;wenow may find DVDs or Blue Ray discs.
What makes the Internet especially fit for these purposes is the general structure of Internet practice as management of the self and the general"undisciplinedd iscipline" of the users.P racticing this undisciplined discipline may include attending prayer groups,reading circles,etc. but usingthe platforms of the Webe nables the new fundamentalist subjects to subject themselves to the discipline of the fundamentalist protocol in the guise of freely choosing -individually -between what is availableonthe fundamentalist media market. This ability to choose marks the modernity of fundamentalism.
One new fundamentalist set of movements emerging from the Islamic piety movements of the 1970s and 1980s referredtobefore is Salafism.Salafists have been very active in appropriating the new media, esp.s atellite TV and the Internet. Ap aradigmatic case is aG erman Salafi group runningt he site diewahrereligion.org.
Salafism
Salafism in Germany (influencing Austria, too) have attracted someinterest in the last years motivated by security concerns.S everal studies tried to analyze this phenomenon (Schneiders 2014 , Ceylan /Jokisch 2014, Said /Fouad 2014). We will focus on the website mentioned above.The grouprunning this site is known for the campaign of distributing copies of aG ermant ranslation of the Quran in Germany,A ustria, and Switzerland. It is slowly internationalizing distributing, e. g.,inSweden (https://www.facebook.com/diewahrereligion;January 9, 2016, in Malmö).
Thes ite is linked to an active Facebook account and aY ouTube channel (https://www.youtube.com/user/Allahsreligion/) offering many videos.Central to all thesesites is the campaign of distributing free copies of the Quran.The older version of the homepage had aseparate section for videos (see Lohlker 2016) now available on the YouTube channel.
Thevideosmay be categorized as mission videos,includingv erbal and other attacksonthe peopledistributing the Quran,conversions to Islam, and religious issues.
Themission videos try to attractthe audience through the performance of the Salafi missionaries to ad eeper studyo ft he contentsp rovided to the people passing by.The images of the video cause an effectofashock transmitted through the images showing people sacrificing their time,their energy to the Salafi cause. By viewing these scenes,t he audience gets attracted to the religiously imbued fundamentalist contentb roughtc lose to him or her. Even if we donth ave an esthetic shock, in this case,wemay apply Benjaminsnotion of the surreal to these videos (see below).
Thevideos have to submit to the protocols of the platform YouTube and the users are left with three optionsdue to the structure of this platform (e.g., Vonderau 2009): 1) viewing,2 )v iewing and embedding the video in self-produced Webc ontent, or 3) commenting upon. Again, the freedomo ft he Webi se asily discernible as aguidedfreedom.
Thedemarcation of boundaries is to be seen in several of the videos on religious issues criticizing non-acceptable way of living, acting,orbelieving defining what is not allowed among the members of the community.Onthe other hand behavior acceptable for the groupi sa ptly described. Thec ommunityb uildinge ffect is reinforced by showing the public activities during the distribution of the Quran campaign.
All these effects are presented in atop-down way leaving to the viewer the reperformance of the performance seen on the screen, to make the digitalc ode behind the digitalicon (see below) visible in his life.
OtherS alafi preachers are active online.Ar enownedS alafi preacher from Mauritania, Muhammadal-Hasan Ould al-Dedew(see Salem 2013, p. 93 ;and his official page at http://dedewnet.com/), established aY ouTube channel in 2009.
As of November 2012, videos at this channel had been viewed nearly 500,000 times. The videos,most of them capturing remarksthe Shaykhgave to live audiences,cover topics such as endowments […] ,hajj, and various fatwas the Shaykhhas issued. In many videos the Shaykh speaksinmodernstandard Arabic […],rather than the Hassaniyya dialect that is widespread in Mauritania. This linguisticc hoiced emonstrates his facility in the language of classical scholarship and makes his words intelligible to ab road Arab audience (Thurston 2012, p. 66) .
Thevideosofthis Salafi preacherare disseminated through several channelsnow, adaptedtoother languages using subtitles (e.g., German subtitles at the channel GermanyRida). Most of the videos present speeches,interviews, and the preacher participating in discussions.This way of distributing content is much more putting religion online than creating online creation ac lassification developed by Helland:" Adistinction between online religion (where the religious activity actually occurred in the onlineenvironment) and religion online (where the medium was used as atool to facilitate religious activity in the offline world)" (see Helland 2012) . Helland stated when studying online activity associated with Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan Government in Exile, it becamevery clear that many peoplewithin this tradition do religion online by watching the Dalai Lama performr itual activitiesa nd communicatei nformation about their religion -o fc ourse many religious traditions function in this way.T his activity is clearly "religion online" andthe flow of information is absolutely from one-to-many.However, it is also aw ay of "doing" religion, much like sitting at the feet of the guru to receive a blessing or teachings,itisapowerful form of religious engagementand one that happens online now much more frequentlyw ith the development of new technologies that can broadcast HD and HP (high powered) sermons from charismatic religious leaders and teachers (Helland 2012) .
Although publishing videos of Salafi preachers onlinemay be seen as adeficient version of religion restrictingthe audiencetolistening and viewing thesevideos,it is another way of "doing" religion that leads to offline action publisheda gain online as in the case of diewahrereligion.
Otherinstances of creating an onlinecontext for "doing" religion, Salafi style, may easily be found, e. g.,the YouTube channel salafmedia of the Somalipreacher Maxamed cAbdi Umal (see also https://www.facebook.com/salafmedia1) was set up in 2011 andhas been viewed (January 15, 2016) 3,088,204 times.Most of the videos are filmed versions of his speeches,a llowing the followers to attend the lecturesvirtually and thus watching the performance of the preacher, his way of "doing"religion.
Sometimes videos are used for ar estaging of Salafi speakers who have died withoutbeing filmed. Aprominent Salafi theoretician,Muhammad Nāsir ad-Dīn al-Albānī (died 1999) (see http://alalbany.me/), has published many audiocassettes (see http://alalbany.me/), some of them now presented as avideo with or even without visual elements to accompany his verbal statements.T his is afine example for readily submitting to the new regime of visuality on the Web. Avideo biopic Sheikh Nasiruddeen al-Albani -t he Albanian (other titles are available) gives an arration of al-Albānī thus givingt he opportunity to construct ah istorically founded identity as aSalafi to the viewer. Another Salafi tradition is created when prominent Saudi scholars,a l-Albānī ,a nd othersa re presented together reciting the first chapter of the Quran( https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sp Cl52THKF0).
AD ailymotion channel presents as lightly different image of Salafism: amatouab. Theu sual videos of -a ll Arabs -p reachersa re available.Avery special video shows the texts of the scholarly books on niqāb,t he face-covering veil, following the reader line after line making it possible for the viewertoperform his own reading. Salafi couples are filmed as an exampleoffamily life with asong as backgroundm usic sung by women. Other videos visualize the story told in a Hadith, atraditionofthe deeds and sayings of the prophet, situated in anostalgic bedouin setting.Acapella songs are played with dynamicgraphicsasthe visual element;agirls choir performsasong in praise of the Muslimveil. But videos of other songs are available not evidently conveying aS alafi message-unless the absence of the wife afamily settingmay be an indicator.
"Doing" religion may have am ore public aspect when we look at videos showing, e. g.,p ublic gatherings of Tu nisian Salafists with ag roup of men performing somem artial arts moves in front of an audience acclaiming this per-formance.The Salafi speakers are seen waitingfor their partofthe event (https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=49hsA5EzFX8).
Videos are also usedasameans to create anew brand of Salafism through the media,s tressingt he need to understand the agency of technology.I nh er case study of the YouTube channel salafimedia -not available at the time of writingStadlbauer writes:
Salafimedia identifiesa st he most authentic and most modern Muslim community (ummah), as demonstrated in their most recent video posting, entitled The New Salafimedia Rebrand Video 2013:4 th Year Relaunch. Describing theirn ew identity as rebrandedand Salafism as abrand indexes marketingorbusiness strategies -anew brand usually sellsanew outlook. Furthermore,e mploying the metaphorso f" rewriting the script" and "going back to the drawing board" further communicatest he members desires to reorganize and change their story, more so sincet hey increasinglyh ave to respond toaccusations of radicalization by the UK government. Salfimedia becomes a platform forsocialaction, and their beliefs become politicized.
Therebranding video has two parts:the first part presents action sequences and specialeffects that accompanyimportant messages.For instance,the video begins with the imageofalion, later explained by "MayAllah make us have the roar of a lion, with the heart of alion". Te xt runs through the screen, urging the audienceto "believe in it, live by it, be readytodie for it", where it refers to the promise of Allah, the call, or the revelation. In the transition to the second part, awild black horse gallops over ad ark, war-torn, post-apocalyptic world accompanied by lightning flashes,s ymbolizing both the destruction of ac orrupt world and the renewal and powerthroughSalafi Islam.
In the second part, four lecturerss cold an imaginary Muslim audience about having forgotten the core message of theProphet Muhammadfrom 1400 years ago.For special effects,superimposed animations of gunshots are fired through the screen and followed by explosions.The men project Salafism as "the truth and nothing but the truth" and they tell their followers that they are the best ummah. Especially prominent are the speakers repeated calls to "enjoin the good and forbid the evil", highlighting the binary oppositions between the Salafis (the good) and the Western unbelievers or kufar (the evil). Only througharadical reorientationt ot he way of the salaf can the global ummah regain agency,strength, power, and victory. Thevideo is an urgent wake-upcall for misguided Muslims (Stadlbauer 2013). This attempt to create third spaces (Hoover /Echchaibi 2014) demonstrates the potential of online videos,e ven if we do not share the worldview of the people running this video channel.I tm eans the videos as a rebranding mechanism, Stadlbauer takingupthe title of the video mentioned above,makingpossible the creation of new form of Salafism not seen before.All the videos discussed here hint at an audience interested in creatingt heir own -S alafi -s ubjectivity submittingtothe "undisciplined discipline" mentioned above.
An -a gain:u nder-researched-aspect of Salafiv ideo activity online is the existence of many religious satellite TV channels.What makesthe specific Salafi branding of these channels?
As a[n] […] approach that placess trong emphasiso nliterally mimicking the pious ancestors,looks are veryimportant. Salafisview mannerisms of the Prophet,wearing along beard for example,asaconstantreminder of their commitment that will help avoid sin. These choices are reflected visually on Salafistations:preachers wear long beards and the same type of clothing that the first generation of Islam would have worn, whereas preachers affiliated with the Brotherhood or who define themselves as non-Salafi wear less conspicuousr obes or as uit and tie.T he near total exclusiono fw omen from the airwaves reflectsSalafismsmore rigidviews on gender relations -aclear distinction from non-Salafi media.F or example,o na l-Resalah, aK uwait-based non-Salafi satellite station, several female Egyptian ulema, who appear on-air wearing only the hijab, are listed as "stars of al-Reselah".
[…] Another feature of Salafi networksisa nunwillingness to give platforms to non-Salafi viewpoints:while other religious stations may give airtimeto Salafi preachers they disagreewith when given the chance,Salafis do not return the favor. (Field /Hamam 2009, p. 5) But there are many other examples of the branding of af undamentalistw orldview,not a rebranding. One of them is Hindutva for the realm of Hinduism.
Hindutva
TheH indu-nationalistm ovement calledH indutva is ap rominent case demonstratingt he importance of Internet activities for fundamentalist movements. There are somediscussions whether the concept of fundamentalism may be applied in this case since Hinduism is understood as ac onceptually non-exclusive religion without fundamentalt exts as in the monotheist religions.R eferring to Riesebrodt again, we may say Hindutva as an exclusive movement based on a selective relecture of areligious tradition shaping the subjectivity of its followers through apious way of living based on the cultivation of aspecific religious ethos. This allows us to describe Hindutva is afundamentalist movement -much more political as in the first case study (e.g.,Arvind 2002;Six 2006).Some authorsmake ad istinctionb etween religious Hindu fundamentalism and political Hindu fundamentalism (e.g., Ceming2004).
Aresearcher argued,"the internet, in particular, seemstobethe chosen medium for the Hindu nationalists workingintechnology to promote Hindutva", as they "help maintain over five hundred VHPW eb sites through whichtospread their messages about Hindutva, Hindu history,a nd Muslim-bashing" (Chopra 2006, p. 194) .
Tw okey principles have been identified that inform the audiovisual rhetoric of Hindu nationalism:
First, the videodemonstrates that the Hindutva politics of representation is based on the technique of "intervisuality", wherebymeaning emerges from the dynamic interplay of aesthetic and symbolic spaces and social practices.Second, Hindutva rhetoric relies on the use of "wish-images", through which imaginary "think-spaces" are opened that enable its ideologues to generate ideas of ac risis-ridden imagined community of Hindu nationals against the backdrop of aG olden Age and au topianf uture ( Brosius 2002, p. 265) .
Brosiuscontinues:
Ih ave highlighted the Hindutvap roject to use video as an instrument for political transformation. It does so through the mimetic appropriation of already circulating narratives,iconographies and genres from the sphere of popular visual representation, and political and religious practices. New meaning is evolved when familiarimagery and narratives are situated in the new or alteredc ontext of dichotomies such as crisis and solution, exile/imprisonment and liberation, and stereotypes of "tolerant Hindus", "aggressive Muslims", the unresponsivestate,and so on. Amidst this process of connectionmaking and-breaking in the videos,H indutva spokesmen attempt to translate the abstract ideao fnationalism into a"natural" object to be addressed through the intimate familial relationshipo fd eshbhakti. Their dynamic practice of inter visuality not only connects different aesthetic realms but creates references to an alleged primordial, shared national past through language that is interpenetrated, via wish-images,w ith a desire for utopia.
However,t he terrain of self-representation is ac ontested one,a sH indutva representatives have discrepant ideas about communication and the disciplining of imagined audiences (for example,regarding the priority of text versus image). Indoctrination via spectacle,e ntertainment, and "information", enshrinedi nt he dense aesthetic and stylistic network of montage,magical realism, and mimesis,are the means through which the Hindutva ideologues attempted to "tickle" their audiences during the height of the Ayodhya campaign. TheH indutva rhetoric of peoplese mpowerment is based on the power of desire,ortemptation: While imagery, narratives and script create visions of a potent and "able body" of Hindu brethren, on the one hand, the viewers are "tamed" by metamorphosing them into disciplined, infantile devotee-machines and selflessmartyrs on the battlefieldofnationalism […] (Brosius 2002, p. 292 ).
Thecreation of martyrsmay be seen in the videos of the YouTube channel hindutvainus (https://www.youtube.com/user/hindutvainus/videos) showing training sessionso ft he Hindutva organization RSS demonstratingi ts "well-disciplined discipline" and the necessity to fight. Brosius analyzed the structure of Hindutva online activities fromanotherangle in her study on HinduUnity.org:
We can venture to say that the Webprovides aplace for the creation of anew form of intercultural and transnationali conography,e ven to those committed to militantn ationalism and opposed to interculturaldialogue. In building this dynamic repertoire of images and visual rhetoric, symbols of the threatening Other are "magicallyf ixed" throught he strategies of appropriation, defamation, or humiliation. We are reminded here of akey text by Evelyn Kallen entitled"Hate on the Net" […] .Kallen distinguishes three interconnected means of using the Weba sa"hate-mongering" tool:A n" invalidation myth" defines the target group (e.g.the Muslims) as inferior/dangerous;an"invalidation theory" provides the ideological framework, arguments and "evidence" to rhetorically attack minority groups; and finally as "a platform for organized community action",ahate website urges and provides the communicative means for the "threatened community" to take steps to aggressively counter or eliminate the purported threat.
Thea im of HU is to createb oth an actual and an imagined virtual brotherhood of militant Hindus and to claim rights to representation over this homogenized community. Theconsumers of this vision are otherwise physically out of reach to each other and to the prime movers of HU (social encounters happen predominantly on the net;r eal world encounters within HU seem rare). Thev isitors to the HU site can then be seen as an audience responding to the facilitation of ac ommunication platform, responding to projections of Hindus seen and shown as victims,j udges,o rs oldiers.T hrough various performative strategies,the affective components of the possibility to participate in this world of victims,judges,vigilantes and soldiers,and the urge to "make an impact" on this world, are evoked. Thetenor of all the articles and imagesavailable,onand through the HU homepage,isone of ongoingconfrontation and crisis:Hindutva,for the makers and producers of HU,isthe organized, aggressive,cohesive articulation of what it is to be a Hindu today, and is the only way to protect Hindu identity against national and international threats.HUcreates credibility,and thus authority,byentangling the visitor in a claustrophobic space,s eemingly filled with countless details of "the evidenceo ft he historical and ongoinghumiliation, torture and abuse of Hindus". And having done so,it puts forward what it calls "justified"s trategies to encounter the cause/s of this crisis.
Even though most of the images,rhetoric and ideological content put on display on a website like HinduUnity are not new,a nd can be traced back to the writings of Sangh Parivarideologues such as Veer SavarkarorGolwalkar, it is the ways in which the images are presented and combined that constitutes as trange amalgam of virtual reality/actuality,or, as Iindicated in the title of this article,surreality.Iemploy the term surrealism with somedeliberation. Iuse it here in referencetotwo issues whichIfind are at stake in the Hindu Rightsu se of the internet:O ne is the conscious alignment of two or more different images,e ach drawn from different" real" locations or contexts within one composition, creating through the juxtapositiono ft wo already familiarm aterials a strange feeling of augmented and renewed familiarity that causes aheightened, uncanny sense of reality.The second issue emergesfrom the idea of montage andpulls in cultural historian Walter Benjaminsw orko nm edia aesthetics and propaganda. Benjamins notion of the surreal proposedt hat the effect of as hock transmitted through image consumption brings to as tandstill the free flow of associations.T he aesthetic shock freezes perceptionand at the same time heightens our senses;itcreates an aurabymeans of which the necessary critical distance of the viewing subject succumbs to the concentrated transmission of ideologicallyi mbued content. Them agical condensation of meaning embodied in images brings the viewed object closetous, rendersitasifitwere tactile,and makes available to our desires and fears what otherwise remains abstractand distant. Fetishization (which pulls one closer to the object or feelingdesired) and xenophobia (which repels and makes more distant the "other")a re thus simultaneously central to the virtual surrealism of HinduUnity […] (Brosius 2004, pp.140 f.) .
This surreality may be seen in aless elaborate form in the Salafi videos discussed before.D ue to the aversion to pictorial representation in the Salafi varieties of Islam it has to be constructed as as erieso fs peech acts.F or Hindutva, it is importanttonotice the impact of the rhetorics and visualproduction will have on the individual activists who are to follow the ideals propagated in the videosb eing subjected to the effects of the media and only free to perform the message.
One aspect of Hindutva video practice is still to be mentioned. At the website sarvarkar.org dedicated to the ideologueo ft he movement V. D. Sarvarkar (id. 1966) has avideo section.Inthis sectionare several videos starting with aclip of Sarvarkar himself and offering some visualdocuments and documentary films. We may read this as the construction of ahistory of the movement and its founder using videosasameans to buildanidentity on the foundational relecturer of the religious tradition. Avery active Twitter account of the journal Hinduism Today (see https://twitter.com/HinduismToday) highlights another aspect of Hindutva online activity.
Tu rning to the performativea spect of religion online,w em ay look into a phenomenon that is specific for online Hinduism:the Hindu temples on the Web. Although these sites may not endorse the program of Hindutva, they are nevertheless afocus of Hindutva followers.
Analytically speaking,three "types" constitute the domain of Hindu temples on the Web: (1) the templehomepage,which functions as the online home for aphysical temple;(2) the commercial puja site,which facilitates rituals servicesinprominent temples on behalf of their clients for afee;and (3) the Hindu discourse site,which presentsthe templeasa virtual space for mediation, prayera nd explicationo fH indu religious discourse (Mallapragada 2010, p. 110) .
Theauthorargues
that Hindu temples sites demonstrate the emergence of what Icall "desktop deity culture" constituted through the practiceso fd igital darshan, online rituals,a nd virtual Hinduism.These Webpractices,inturn,exemplify the "remediation" (Bolter and Grusin) of new mediaconceptualizationsofdigitality, network capital flows,hypertextuality and virtuality as they are articulated to ideaso ft he Hindu image,e mbodied ritual practiceand the temporal and spatial logic of the temple as asacred place (Mallapragada 2010, p. 111 ).
These templesites may be understood as "repurposing older media forms such as photographs of deities,Hindu calendar art, the analogsacred texts and temple books,a udio tapes of religious discourset hrough their textual and discursive practices of representing online temples" (ibid.). As such they fit into the category of performing religion online and can be appropriated by everybody participating as far as the structureo ft he site allows participation. Again theses ites are dominated by the protocol or the code of the site.This domination throughprotocol is much more evident in another online practice not explored here:digitalgames. Afirst study on the first India-produced digital game Hanuman:BoyWarrior (see Zeiler 2014) has opened up the Asians phere of gaminga nd religion. Hindutva online activities especially try to reach the US diaspora, another aspect not to be discussed here (see Therwath 2012).
RepetitiveP erformance
An added value of fundamentalist internet activity is the possibility to perform again and again the true message of god, the repetitive effectofinternet videos, e. g.,lends itself easily to arepetitiveperformance,staging and embodiment of the fundamentalist ethosand subjectivity or the protocolstructuring fundamentalist subcultures and communities.
Another added value of Internet activity is the fact that persons acting as leaderso fc ommunal congregationsa ct todaya sa ctors in front of an audience feeling as part of aperformance blurring the distinction between producing and produced (see Lohlker 2016) . So any fundamentalist actor understands himself or herself as performing the fundamental ethos of his or her group,n ot only reproducing it.
Is the Internet fundamentalist?E vidently not!B ut technological structures and technological practices of the self-lend itself can easily be used by fundamentalist individuals,g roups,o rganizations,a nd networks.B orisG roy contributedtothis discussion when speakingabout "the digitized religion" and the role of videos (forapreliminary analysis see Lohlker 2016):
However […],the new religious movements operate primarily through the Internetby means of digitala nd not mechanical reproduction.D uring the last decades,v ideo has become the chosen medium of contemporary religious propaganda and is distributed throughd ifferent TV channels,t he Internet, commercial video stores, 1 etc. This is especially true in the case of the most recent, most active, and even aggressiver eligious movements. […] This use of the video as the majormedium of self-presentation among 1W emay note the Eurocentric bias in not mentioningthe role of audio-cassettes and radio in non-"Western" environments (see for ac ase study in Egypt Hirschkind 2006) (R.L.). different religious movementsisarelatively new phenomenon. […] At this point, Iw ould argue that the use of video as the principal medium by contemporary religious movements in intrinsic to the message of these movements.Neither is it external to the understanding of the religious, as such, as it underlies this use.This is not to suggest, following MarshallM cLuhan,t hat here the medium is the message but rather, as Iwould argue,that the message has become the medium -aparticular religious messagehas become the digital code.
Digital images have the propensity to generate,t om ultiply,a nd to distribute themselves almostanonymously through openfields of the contemporarymeans of communication.
[…] digitalizationseems to guarantee aliteral reproduction of atext or image more effectively than any other known technique.Naturally,itisnot so much the digital image itself as the image file,the digital data which remains identicalthrough the process of its reproductionand distribution. However,the image file is not an image -the image file is invisible. Thedigital imageisaneffect of the visualization of the invisible digital data (Groys2011, p. 27).
Thedigitalimage can be seen only being performed.Byperforming something it is always interpretedo re ven misused through interpretation. This hints at the fundamental fallacy of fundamentalism claimingtoreturn to the original meaning by constructing ap art of its religious tradition as the original version without being aware of its technique of interpretation. Theimmutability of the digital file does not guarantee the immutability of content sinceithas to be transformed into human practice-performed (see Lohlker 2016) . "In this respect, the digital image functions as aByzantineicon -asavisible representation of invisible digital data. Thedigital code seems to guarantee the identity of differentimages that function as visualization of this code" (Groys 2011, p. 29) . And in this respect, we may understand videos on the Weba saparadigmatic representation of the fundamentalist belief in the immutability of the sources of religious traditions -affected by the sameproblems fundamentalisms has to meet in offline reality.But again: videos are not fundamentalist per se. If the structureso fv ideo production, dissemination,transformation and perception on the Webthat lend itself to afundamentalist use it is possible to imagineanon-fundamentalistvideo production. That is beyond the framework of this article.
To thinkabout anew reflected practice of using the Internet is still to be done, be it in religious practices or any other form. We should remind ourselves of the problems of expressing the relation to anon-human reality in human language in an oldercommunication system,oral and literal (see Giesecke 1992) .
In the beginnings of research on religion and the Internet, there was aproblem concerning the "textual character of so much computer-mediated communication. Can religious experience be embodiedi nw ords alone?" (Dawson 2006, p. 17) Now we arefacing the problem of religious practiceembodied in moving pictures on the screen to be reflected upon in the context of the technicalobjects (see Simondon 2014) in theirinterrelations to human actors.
